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Klein: Federal Courts - 42 U.S.C. 1983 - Suing Municipalities under 42 U

FEDERAL COURTS-42 U.S.C. § 1983-SUING MUNICIPALITIES UNDER
42 U.S.C. § 1983: THE IMPACT OF MONELL v. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
SERVICES.

I. INTRODUCTION

When the Supreme Court decided Monroe v. Pape,' it resurrected the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Act) 2 "from ninety years of obscurity" 3 by broadening the scope of section 1983. 4 That same decision, however, provided the
basis for returning the Act from whence it came, as it severely limited section 1983's effect by refusing to allow municipalities to be subject to its sanctions. 5 In the years following Monroe, various methods were developed to
circumvent its municipal immunity rule. 6 The Supreme Court rejected every
such attempt 7 to circumvent Monroe until it decided Monell v. Department
of Social Services," in which the Court reversed Monroe's municipal immu-

nity doctrine and held that municipalities could be sued under section 1983. 9
In Monell, petitioners, female employees 10 of the New York City Board
of Education and Department of Social Services, brought a class action 11

against respondent employers 12 under section 1983, seeking injunctive and
monetary relief. 13 The gravamen of petitioners' complaint was that the
employers had, as a matter of official policy, compelled pregnant female
employees to take unpaid leaves of absence despite the lack of medical justification for such a policy. 14 The United States District Court for the
1. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat.
13). For the text of this statute, see note 24 infra.
3. Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1169
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Section 1983 and Federalism].
4. For a discussion of how Monroe broadened the scope of the § 1983 cause of action, see
note 43 infra.
5. 365 U.S. at 191.
6. For a general discussion of the ways in which the courts attempted to circumvent Monroe, see notes 51-78 and accompanying text infra.
7. See, e.g.,
Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S.
507 (1973); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
8. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
9. Id. at 690.
10. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 394 F. Supp. 853, 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The original
complaint was filed on July 26, 1971, with the plaintiffs being Monell, an employee of the
Department, and Terrall and Zapata, employees of the Board. Id. An amended complaint was
filed on September 14, 1972, which added plaintiff Abbey, who was also employed by the
Board. Id.
11. Id. It had been previously determined that the action could be brought as a class action.
Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 357 F. -Supp. 1051, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
12. 436 U.S. at 661. The defendants were the Department of Social Services and its Commissioner, the Board of Education and its Chancellor, and the City of New York and its Mayor.
Id. The individual defendants were sued solely in their official capacities. Id. For a discussion of
official capacity suits and the municipal immunity doctrine, see notes 66-69 and accompanying
text infra.
13. 394 F. Supp. at 854.
14. Id. at 855. The record showed that each of the four plaintiffs was directed to take
maternity leave approximately one month before her doctor would have ordered her to do so.
id.

(1008)
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Southern District of New York held that the claims for injunctive relief were
rendered moot by an interim official change in maternity leave policy, 15 and
that although petitioners' civil rights had been violated, 16 their claims for
back pay were barred by Monroe. 17 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed,' 8 but the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that municipalities were to be considered "persons" for the
purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.19
This comment will discuss the Monell Court's holding in light of the
relevant legislative history of section 1983 and the relevant underlying case
law. 20 The anticipated impact of Monell and the question of whether the
decision has provided new impetus to the Civil Rights Act of 1871 will also
21
be explored.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Legislative History
The Civil Rights Act of 1871 22 was, in the view of one author, enacted
by Congress in order to achieve two broad goals: "(1) to provide civil and
criminal sanctions to deter infringements upon civil rights; and (2) to provide
authority to the government to meet with force unlawful combinations and
violence which interfered with civil rights or the execution of justice or federal law." 23 Section 1 of the Act, now codified in section 1983, 24 re15. Id. The Department of Social Services changed its maternity leave policy to provide that
a woman may remain on her job as long as she is able to continue her duties. id. The City and
the Board of Education soon followed this policy. Id.
16. Id. The United States Supreme Court has held that this practice is unconstitutional. See
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
17. 394 F. Supp. at 855.
18. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 532 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1976).
19. 436 U.S. at 690. The Court also determined that although a municipality could now be
sued under § 1983, municipal liability could not be predicated upon a theory of respondeat
superior. Id. at 691.
20. See notes 22-100 and accompanying text infra.
21. See notes 139-69 and accompanying text infra.
22. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. This Act was entitled: "An Act to enforce the
Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and for other
purposes." Id. In enacting this legislation, Congress was responding to a message from President Grant in which he had urged the enactment of legislation to deal with "[a] condition of
affairs .. . in some of the States of the Union rendering life and property insecure." CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 236 (1871) [hereinafter cited as CONG. GLOBE]. As one author has
stated: "The President was ... referring to the rising tide of terrorism .. .led by the Ku Klux
Klan." B. SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 591 (1970). See CONG. GLOBE,
supra, at 320 (remarks of Rep. Stoughton).
23. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, at 591.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat.
13). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
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flected the first of these purposes, 25 and provided a cause of action for anyone who alleges that he has been deprived of his constitutionally protected
26
rights by a person who has acted under color of state law.
Neither section 1983 nor the Act as a whole specifically discusses
whether a municipal corporation can be held liable for constitutional deprivations under color of law occurring within its corporate boundaries. 27 The
issue of municipal liability under the Act was initially raised during the debates on the Sherman amendment, 28 which, as originally introduced and
passed by the Senate, 29 would have held all inhabitants of a municipality

Id. Its jurisdictional counterpart is found in § 1343(3) of the Judicial Code. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)
(1976). Section 1343(3) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law
to be commenced by any person: ....
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any
State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States.
Id.
25. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, at 591. This section has been the source of volumes
of civil rights litigation. See Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 3, at 1172-74. Justice
Stewart described this section's purpose as being "to interpose the federal courts between the
States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect the people from
unconstitutional action under color of state law." Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
Justice Douglas has viewed § 1983 as having the following purposes: "First, it might, of course,
override certain kinds of state laws. . . . Second, it provided a remedy where state law was
inadequate. . . . [t]hird, . . . [it] provide[d] a federal remedy where the state remedy, though
adequate in theory, was not available in practice." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-74
(1961).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). For the text of this statute, see note 24 supra. The term "color
of law" was defined in two criminal cases brought under the criminal sections of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242 (1976); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945);
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). The Court determined that "[m]isuse of power,
possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with
the authority of state law, is action taken 'under color of' state law." Id. at 326. The Court in
Monroe expanded this definition of "color of state law" to civil actions brought under § 1983.
See 365 U.S. at 187. For an extended discussion of the emergence of the § 1983 cause of action,
see Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 3, at 1167-75.
27. See, e.g., B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, at 591-93; Kates & Kouba, Liability of Public
Entities Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 131, 133 (1972). Cf.
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-92 (1961) (Court looked to legislative debates for its finding).
28. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 22, at 663; Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 665 (1978); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 188-91 (1961).
29. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 22, at 663. As originally proposed, the Sherman amendment read as follows:
That if any house, tenement, cabin, shop, building, barn, or granary shall be unlawfully or feloniously demolished, pulled down, burned, or destroyed, wholly or in part, by
any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together; or if any person shall unlawfully and with force and violence be whipped, scourged, wounded, or killed by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together; and if such offense was committed to
deprive any person of any right conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, or to deter him or punish him for exercising such right, or by reason of his
race, color, or previous condition of servitude, in every such case the inhabitants of the
county, city, or parish in which any of the said offenses shall be committed shall be liable
to pay full compensation to the person or persons damnified by such offense if living, or
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liable for civil rights violations occurring within the municipality.3 0 When
this version of the Sherman amendment was rejected by the House of Representatives, 31 the first Conference Committee substituted a version which
would have held a municipality vicariously liable for damage done to the
person or property of its inhabitants by private persons, "riotously and
tumultuously assembled." 32 The House, concerned as to whether Congress

to his widow or legal representative if dead; and such compensation may be recovered by
such person or his representative by a suit in any court of the United States of competent
jurisdiction in the district in which the offense was committed, to be in the name of the
person injured, or his legal representative, and against said county, city, or parish. And
execution may be issued on a judgment rendered in such suit and may be levied upon
any property, real or personal, of any person in said county, city, or parish, and the said
county, city, or parish may recover the full amount of such judgment, costs and interest,
from any person or persons engaged as principal or accessory in such riot in an action in
any court of competent jurisdiction.
Id. The Sherman amendment was introduced by Senator Sherman immediately prior to the
Senate's vote on H.R. 320 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 666 (1978). The rules of the Senate prohibited discussion of the amendment, and
although attempts were made to amend the amendment, it was passed as introduced. Id., citing
CONG. GLOBE, supra note 22, at 663.
30. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 22, at 663. The amendment as passed by the Senate did not
make municipalities liable, but rather made individual inhabitants of the municipalities liable.
See 436 U.S. at 666 n.14., citing CONG. GLOBE, supra note 22, at 663.

31.

CONG. GLOBE,

supra note 22, at 725.

32. Id. at 749. The Conference Committee substitute amendment provided that the government would be liable for damages assessed against its own inhabitants if the judgment was
not satisfied by the inhabitants who had committed the deprivation of civil rights. Id. If a
municipality were held liable, the judgment against it could be collected through a lien on all
public property. Id. The complete text of the first conference substitute for the Sherman
amendment read as follows:
That if any house, tenement, cabin, shop, building, barn or granary shall be unlawfully or feloniously demolished, pulled down, burned or destroyed, wholly or in part, by
any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together; or if any person shall unlawfully and with force and violence be whipped, scourged, wounded, or killed by any persons riotously or tumultuously assembled together, with intent to deprive any person of
any right conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of the United States, or to
deter him or punish him for exercising such right, or by reason of his race, color, or
previous condition of servitude, in every such case the county, city, or parish in which
any of the said offenses shall be committed shall be liable to pay full compensation to the
person or persons damnified by such offense, if living, or to his widow or legal representative if dead; and such compensation may be recovered in an action on the case by such
person or his representative in any court of the United States of competent jurisdiction in
the district in which the offense was committed, such action to be in the name of the
person injured, or his legal representative, and against said county, city, or parish, and in
which action any of the parties committing such acts may be joined as defendants. And
any payment of any judgment, or part thereof unsatisfied, recovered by the plaintiff in
such action, may, if not satisfied by the individual defendant therein within two months
next after the recovery of such judgment upon execution duly issued against such individual defendant in such judgment, and returned unsatisfied, in whole or in part, be
enforced against such county, city, or parish, by execution, attachment, mandamus, garnishment, or any other proceeding in aid of execution or applicable to the enforcement of
judgments against municipal corporations; and such judgment shall be a lien as well upon
all moneys in the treasury of such county, city, or parish, as upon the other property
thereof. And the court in any such action may on motion cause additional parties to be
made therein prior to issue joined, to the end that justice may be done. And the said
county, city, or parish may recover the full amount of such judgment, by it paid, with

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol24/iss5/6

4

Klein: Federal Courts - 42 U.S.C. 1983 - Suing Municipalities under 42 U

1012

VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

24: p. 1008

could constitutionally obligate municipalities to uphold the peace, 3 3 rejected
this substitute as well. 3 4 As finally promulgated, the Sherman amendment
3
contained no reference to municipal liability.

5

The debates on the Sherman amendment were the only instances in
which Congress considered the issue of municipal liability under the Act. 3 6
Furthermore, the primary focus of those discussions was whether a municipality could be held vicariously liable for a deprivation of constitutional
rights within its boundaries, 3 7 and the debates never discussed the issue of
whether a municipality is a person within section 1.38 The Sherman
amendment debates thus provide only a limited tool fir evaluating the pro39
priety of section 1983 liability of municipalities.
B. Case Law
1. Monroe v. Pape
The leading decision on the section 1983 cause of action is Monroe v.
Pape,4 0 in which the Court held, inter alia, that municipalities werp not to
be considered "persons" under that section. 41 In so defining the word "person," the Court reasoned that Congress' rejection of the first two versions of
the Sherman amendment implied that Congress did not wish to hold
municipalities liable in any way for violations of section 1983.42 The result

costs and interest, from any person or persons engaged as principal or accessory in such
riot, in an action in any court of competent jurisdiction. And such county, city, or parish,
so paying, shall also be subrogated to all the plaintiff's rights under such judgment.
Id.
33. For a discussion of the issue of the Sherman amendment's constitutionality, see notes
82-84 and accompanying text infra.
34. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 22, at 800-01.
35. Id. at 804. The relevant text of the second Conference Committee substitute for the
Sherman amendment read as follows:
[A]ny person or persons having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done
and mentioned in the second section of this act are about to be committed, and having
power to prevent or aid in preventing the same, shall neglect or refuse so to do, and such
wrongful act shall be committed, such person or persons shall be liable to the person
injured, or his legal representatives.
Id.
36. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
37. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 22, at 751-52, 754-66, 787-95, 798-800.
38. Id.
39. For a general discussion of the various criticisms which have been directed at Monroe's
use of legislative history, see notes 44-50 and accompanying text infra.
40. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). In Monroe, plaintiffs brought an action under § 1983, seeking
damages from the City of Chicago and 13 of its police officers. Id. at 168-69. The gravamen of
the complaint was that the police officers had violated plaintiffs' fourteenth amendment rights as
a result of a warrantless search and subsequent brutual acts. Id. at 169-71. The Court held that the
complaint stated a valid cause of action against the police officers. Id. at 184-87. The Court,
however, dismissed the complaint as to the City of Chicago. Id. at 192.
41. Id. at 191-92. For the text of § 1983, see note 24 supra.
42. 365 U.S. at 187-91. More fully, the Monroe Court stated: "The response of the Congress
to the proposal to make municipalities liable for certain actions being brought within federal
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of the Monroe decision was to severely limit the efficacy of the section 1983
43
cause of action by eliminating an important potential defendant.
Monroe has been criticized for wrongly inferring from the legislative
history of the Sherman amendment that Congress did not intend that
municipalities be held liable for section 1983 causes of action. 44 The debates indicate that Congress, in rejecting vicarious liability under the Sherman amendment, 45 did not necessarily intend to make municipalities completely immune from suit under section 1983.46 The Monroe Court thus
purview by the Act of April 20, 1871, was so antagonistic that we cannot believe that the word
'person' was used in this particular Act to include them." Id. at 191. For a general discussion of
the Sherman amendment, see notes 28-39 and accompanying text supra.
43. See Note, Developing Governmental Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 55 MINN. L.
REv. 1201, 1208-09 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Developing Governmental Liability]. In one
sense, however, the Court in Monroe greatly expanded the § 1983 cause of action. The Court
held that the police officers acted under color of state law in violation of § 1983, even though
their actions were unlawful under state law. 365 U.S. at 184-85. This holding expanded the rule
of United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), and Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91
(1945), which had defined the term "color of state law" in criminal actions, to civil actions under
§ 1983. 365 U.S. at 184-85. For a further discussion of the phrase "under color of state law," see
note 26 supra. This aspect of the Monroe holding, in the words of one author, "resurrect[ed]
section 1983 from ninety years of obscurity." Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 3, at
1169.
By granting municipalities immunity, however, the Court rendered the cause of action to a
large degree illusory. As another writer has stated:
[W]hile section 1983 provides a federal right of action for damages against state and local
officials, practical and legal obstacles may thwart many meritorious claims. First, it may
be difficult to identify the individual officials responsible for a violation. Second, many
officials lack the financial means to pay substantial judgments. Third, a jury-even when
it is convinced that a plaintiff's constitutional rights have been violated-may be reluctant
to assess damages against an official who is perceived to be under legal attack for doing
what he thought to be his job. Finally, local officials, even when they have violated an
individual's constitutional rights, enjoy a good faith defense to section 1983 actions.
Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalitiesfor Constitutional Violations, 89 HARv. L. REV.
922, 923 (1975-76) [hereinafter cited as Damage Remedies]. See also Monell v. Dep't of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 707-08 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring); Hundt, Suing Municipalities Directly Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 770, 778 (1975); Developing
Governmental Liability, supra, at 1209.
44. See 365 U.S. at 191. For criticisms of Monroe's use of legislative history, see, e.g., Kates
& Kouba, supra note 27, at 132-36 (the Monroe Court's reliance on those debates is misplaced;
§ 1983 was not directed to the same considerations as was the Sherman amendment); Levin,
The Section 1983 Municipal Immunity Doctrine, 65 GEO. L. J. 1483, 1491-92, 1519-31 (1977)
(the Sherman amendment debates do not suggest that § 1983 should restrict in any way the
remedies that courts may decree to redress the consequent injury when a city is itself guilty of a
constitutional violation); Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 23, at 1192 ("Monroe's review
of legislative history is highly questionable. First, the debates involved no explicit discussion of
the definition of the word 'person.' Second, the penalties provided by the Sherman Amendment
went well beyond those of section 1983.
...); Developing Governmental Liability, supra note
43, at 1205-07 ("[t]o determine what Congress would have thought had it been thinking about
something it was not is speculative at best and it provides a weak foundation on which to base a
judicial decision."). See also notes 107 & 108 and accompanying text infra.
45. For a general discussion of the Sherman amendment, see notes 28-39 and accompanying
text supra.
46. Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 3, at 1191-92. As one author has stated: "At
best, the legislative history is ambiguous with respect to the liability of municipalities for actions
taken under color of law.
... Id. at 1192. See also Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 437 U.S.
658, 719-24 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For a general discussion of the Monell Court's
analysis of the legislative history, see notes 79-100 and accompanying text infra.
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failed to distinguish between vicarious liability under the Sherman amendment and any form of liability under section 1983. 4 7 As a result of this
48
view, which has become accepted as a faulty interpretation of the debates,
the Monroe Court, without any discussion of the policy issues which support

or refute municipal immunity,4 9 severely limited the remedial effect of section 1983.50

2. Circuit court attempts at circumventing Monroe and Supreme Court
expansion of the Monroe doctrine
Dissatisfaction with Monroe resulted in numerous calls for its reversal. 51 Prior to Monell, however, the Supreme Court continuously rejected
the devices developed to ameliorate the harsness of Monroe and expanded

the notion of municipal immunity under section 1983.52
In Moor v. County of Alameda,53 the Court expanded the concept of
section 1983 municipal immunity to include county immunity. 54 The Moor
Court also held: 1) that a state law abrogating municipal immunity could not
be adopted into federal law through section 1988 of title 42 of the United
States Code; 55 and 2) that the district court's refusal to hear the state claims
47. See Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 3, at 1192. Cf. Levin, supra note 44, at
1519-31 (Congress, in rejecting the Sherman amendment, was rejecting vicarious liability). For
a list of criticisms of the Monroe holding and fora discussion of the Monell Court's view of the
legislative history, see notes 81-92 and accompanying text infra.
48. Regarding Justice Rehnquist's basic acceptance in Monell of the unpersuasiveness of the
Monroe Court's legislative interpretation, see note 96 and accompanying text infra.
49. See 365 U.S. at 191. The Court in Monroe specifically stated: "[W]e do not reach those
policy considerations." Id.
50. For a discussion of the criticisms of Monroe, see note 44 and accompanying text supra.
51. There have been numerous bills introduced in Congress seeking reversal of Monroe. See
Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 177 n.32 (2d Cir.), vacated sub noa. West Haven v. Turpin,
99 S. Ct. 554 (1978), on remand, Turpin v. Mailet, 591 F.2d 426 (2(1 Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
See also CAUSES OF POPULAR DISSATISFACTION \VITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE:
HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM.

ON

CONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON

THE JUDICIARY, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1976). See also U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
LAW ENFORCEMENT: A REPORT ON EQUAL PROTECTION IN THE SOUTH 179 (1965). Cf. JUSTICE: 1961 UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, Bk. V at 78-82 (1961)
(Monroe has a serious limitation in that it does not reach the guilty officer's employers: the city).
52. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507
(1973); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
53. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
54. Id. at 710. There is dicta in Moor to the effect that all political subdivisions of a state
may fall within the rule of Monroe. Id. at 708.
55. 1d. at 710. In Moor, petitioners attempted to circumvent Monroe by invoking § 1988 of
title 42 of the United States Code, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976), which authorizes the federal courts
to look to state law in all cases where federal laws are not adapted to the object or are deficient
in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies under the civil rights statutes. 411 U.S.
at 698-99. Utilizing § 1988, plaintiff Moor attempted to incorporate the California statute, which
"created vicarious liability against the County for the actions of its officers that
violated petitioners' federal civil rights." Id. at 698. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.2 (West 1963). The Court, in
rejecting this argument, pointed out that § 1988 permits the utilization of state law only when
the state law is not inconsistent with the Constitution or the laws of the United States. 411 U.S.
at 706-10. In Moor, on the other hand, the application of the California statute that imposed
vicarious liability on municipalities would require the Court to utilize a law in direct conflict
with § 1983 as interpreted in Monroe. Id.
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as an exercise of its pendent jurisdiction 56 was not an abuse of its discretion. 5 7 In Aldinger v. Howard,58 the Court rejected the use of pendent
party jurisdiction 9 to circumvent municipal immunity, 60 and thereby im-

56. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). The doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction gives the district courts power to hear state claims joined with federal claims where
there is no independent ground of federal jurisdiction for the state claim. See id.at 725. There
are three factors to be viewed in determining whether to apply the doctrine: 1) the underlying
federal claim should be substantial enough to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court, id.;
2) the relationship between the state and federal claims must be such that it comprises
"but one constitutional case," meaning that if the state and federal nature of the claims were
disregarded, the claims would normally be joined together, id.; and 3) the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion and not one of right. Id.at 725-26. The Gibbs Court
further stated: "Its [pendent jurisdiction's] justification lies in considerations of judicial
economy, convenience and fairness to litigants. ...Id. at 726. For a general discussion of the
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, see, e.g., 3A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
18.07, 18.29-74
(2d ed. 1978) [hereinater cited as MOORE'S]; C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs 72-77 (3d

ed. 1976).
57. 411 U.S. at 713-17. The Moor Court reasoned that since there were no independent
grounds of jurisdiction over the county, the state law issue was unsettled, and there were
various defenses which might have led to jury confusion, the district court did not err in
dismissing the pendent claim. Id. Cf Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976) (pendent party
jurisdiction is discretionary). For a general discussion of Aldinger, see notes 58-61 and accompanying text infra. In Moor, the Court did not decide the question of whether the county could
be joined in a proper factual situation, deeming the issue to be "subtle and complex." 411 U.S.
at 715. The Court instead rested its determination solely on the discretionary nature of the
pendent jurisdiction doctrine. Id. See note 56 supra. The question of whether a court had the
power to hear pendent state claims against the county was therefore left open. See 3A MOORE'S,
supra note 56, 20.07, at 20-75 & 20-76. For a general discussion of Moor and municipal
immunity under § 1983, see generally Levin, supra note 44, at 1495-96 & n.48; 2 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 109 (1974).
58. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).

59. See id. The issue involved in "pendent party" jurisdiction is "whether a plaintiff may
join together a claim under the laws of the United States against one party and a claim against
another party under state law." 3A MOORE'S, supra note 56, at 20.07, at 20-72 to 20-76; C.
WRIGHT, supra note 56, at 75-77 & nn.11-25.
In Aldinger, petitioner brought suit against a county official and the county under § 1983,
claiming that her discharge as a county employee violated her first, ninth, and fourteenth
amendment rights. 427 U.S. at 4. She also claimed that the district court had pendent jurisdiction over the state law claims against the parties. Id. Plaintiff's theory was that although Monroe
and Moor mandated that jurisdiction not be exercised as to the county, the state law claims
should be heard as being pendent to a valid § 1983 claim against the official. See id. at 16-17.
The Court refused to develop an encompassing rule as to whether pendent party jurisdiction
was generally allowed. Id. at 13. Instead, the Court determined that the resolution of the issue
of pendent party jurisdiction depends "upon the deductions which may be drawn from congressional statutes as to whether Congress wanted to grant this sort of jurisdiction to federal courts."
Id. at 17.
In Aldinger, the Court held that "a fair reading of the language used in § 1343, together
with the scope of § 1983, requires a holding that the joinder of a municipal corporation, like the
county here, for purposes of asserting a state-law claim not within federal diversity jurisdiction,
is without the statutory jurisdiction of the district court." Id. (footnote omitted). While Aldinger
foreclosed the possibility of using pendent party jurisdiction to join a municipality under § 1983,
it continued to leave the contours of the doctrine generally undefined, making its application
turn on a reading of the underlying jurisdictional statute. Id. For a general discussion of this
issue, see 3A MOORE'S, supra note 56,
20.07, at 20-72 to 20-75; C. WRIGHT, supra note 56,
at 75-77. For a discussion of Moor, see note 57 supra.
60. In an analogous circumvention attempt, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit has deemed that the district court has discretion to hear a state law claim against a
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plicitly reaffirmed the Monroe doctrine. 6 1
The Court further expanded Monroe in City of Kenosha v. Bruno,62 in
which it held that municipalities were immune from actions requesting injunctive as well as monetary relief.6 3 While Kenosha appeared to be one of
the clearest possible expressions of judicial support for Monroe and municipal immunity, 6 4 it did little to clarify the confusion concerning which govmunicipality when the underlying claim is a direct cause of action under the fourteenth
amendment. See Gagliardi v. Flint, 564 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 312
(1978). See also Patzig v. O'Neil, 577 F.2d 841, 850-51 (3d Cir. 1978); Pitrone v. Mercadante,
572 F.2d 98 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 1074 (1978).
61. See Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 696 n.61 (1978). Justice Rehnquist's
dissent in Monell placed great emphasis on the fact that Aldinger, Moor and City of Kenosha v.
Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973), reaffirmed Monroe. See 436 U.S. at 714 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
For a discussion of Justice Rehnquist's dissent, see notes 132-38 and accompanying text infra.
62. 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
63. Id. at 513. Kenosha involved a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief in which the
petitioners, retail liquor establishment owners, claimed that the Wisconsin liquor licensing procedure violated their fourteenth amendment procedural due process rights. Id. at 508. Petitioners brought this action under § 1983, and claimed that the Court had jurisdiction due to the
equitable relief sought. Id. at 511-13. The Court, in rejecting the monetary-injunctive relief
distinction, held:
We find nothing in the legislative history discussed in Monroe, or in the language actually
used by Congress, to suggest that the generic word "person" in § 1983 was intended to
have a bifurcated application to municipal corporations ....
[T]hey are outside its L9
1983's] ambit for purposes of equitable relief as well as for damages.
Id. at 513. justice Douglas, the author of the majority opinion in Monroe, dissented in Kenosha,
contending that one could infer the monetary-injunctive distinction from dicta in Monroe. Id. at
516 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Prior to Kenosha, a number of circuit courts had recognized that suits could be brought
against municipalities in the form of requests for injunctive relief. See, e.g., Garren v.
Winston-Salem, 439 F.2d 140, 141 (4th Cir.), vacated, 403 U.S. 1052 (1971); Harless v. Sweeny
Independent School Dist., 427 F.2d 319, 321-23 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991
(1971); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037, 1038-39 (10th Cir. 1970); Sher v. Board of
Educ., 424 F.2d 741, 744 (3d Cir. 1970); Adams v. City of Park Ridge, 293 F.2d 585, 587 (7th
Cir. 1961). Cf. Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (per curiam) (Court ordered
injunctive relief under § 1983 when municipal immunity was not raised by the parties and not
discussed by the Court). Contra, Rosado v. Wyman, 414 F.2d 170, 178 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd on
other grounds, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); Diamond v. Pitchess, 411 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1969);
Deane Hill Country Club v. Knoxville, 379 F.2d 321, 323-24 (6th Cir. 1967).
Many of the courts which allowed the equitable-monetary distinction had been confused by
a footnote in Monroe in which the Court referred to two cases in which it had granted equitable
relief against cities. See 365 U.S. at 191 n.50, citing Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879
(1955); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943). The Monroe Court had said the
following regarding previous cases where the distinction was allowed: "The question dealt with
in our opinion was not raised in those cases, . . . either by the parties or by the Court. Since
we hold that a municipal corporation is not a 'person' within the meaning of § 1983, no inference to the contrary can any longer be drawn from those cases." 365 U.S. at 191 n.50 (citations
omitted). Despite this language in Monroe, lower courts continued to draw the inference. See,
e.g., Kates & Kouba, supra note 27, at 149-50; 52 N.C.L. REV. 1289, 1293-94 (1974).
For an extended discussion of the ways in which the circuit courts treated the issue of
municipal liability during the time between Monroe and Kenosha, see, e.g., Developing Governmental Liability, supra note 43, at 1210-22; Comment, Suing Public Entities Under the Federal Civil Rights Act: Monroe v. Pape Reconsidered, 43 U. COLO. L. REV. 105, 108-17 (1971);
The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 55, 253 (1973).
64. See 412 U.S. at 513. Cf. Levin, supra note 44, at 1496 (municipalities could never be
defendants in § 1983 cases); Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 3, at 1183 ("the Supreme
Court [in Kenosha] flatly rejected a bifurcated approach").
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ernmental entities were persons under section 1983.65 Furthermore,
Kenosha failed to comment on the status of the official capacity doctrine, 66 a
Monroe circumvention device which lower courts had developed by analogy
to Ex parte Young. 67 In Young, the Court had held that despite a state's
eleventh amendment immunity, a state attorney general could be enjoined

from enforcing an allegedly unconstitutional state statute. 68 Pursuant to the
65. See 412 U.S. 507 (1973). The Monroe immunity doctrine had been expanded to various
entities and subdivisions of the states. See, e.g., Cheramie v. Tucker, 493 F.2d 586 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868 (1974) (state department of highways); United Farmworkers of
Florida Housing Projects, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974) (state
department of pollution control); Sykes v. California, 497 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1974) (state department of motor vehicles); Burris v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 491 F.2d 762 (4th Cir. 1974)
(state department of public welfare); Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974) (state bureau of corrections); Avins v. Mangum, 450 F.2d 932 (2d
Cir. 1971) (state university); Zuckerman v. Appellate Div., Second Dep't Supreme Court of
New York, 421 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1970) (N.Y. App. Div.); Rosado v. Wyman, 414 F.2d
170 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 397 U.S. 397 (1970) (state department of social
services); Clark v. Washington, 366 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1966) (state bar association). For a discussion of the factors courts consider in determining what is a municipality, and a critique of
this unsettled area, see Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 520 F.2d 993, 1004-05 nn.4-8 (5th Cir.
1975) (Godbold, J., dissenting), rev'd on rehearing en banc, 528 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1976),
vacated, 438 U.S. 901 (1978) (remanded in light of Monell) (entities not possessing broad governmental powers and functions can fall within the Monroe-Kenosha exemption).
66. For a discussion of the nature of the official capacity doctrine as a means of circumventing Monroe, see Levin, supra note 44, at 1496-518. Levin, in describing the doctrine, has
stated:
In cases in which a state or local policy is under attack, it is customary to name as the
defendant the officer ultimately responsible for administering the challenged policy, such
as a mayor or a department head. His presence in the litigation is essentially nominal. It
does not depend on his immediate connection with the alleged wrong; he may indeed
have had absolutely no role in putting the challenged policies into effect. He is made a
party to the case for a different reason-because he has authority to use the machinery of
government to take any corrective action ordered. It is generally said, therefore, that he
is sued as a defendant in his official capacity.
Id. at 1497. When an official is sued in his official capacity, there may be no damages awarded
against him individually because he is partially protected by the various immunities of § 1983.
See, e.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975);
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). One might
therefore conclude that a suit brought against an officer in his official capacity is a suit against
the municipality itself, as any damages the plaintiff would recover would have to come from the
city treasury. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 44, at 1498; Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note
3, at 1197; 47 Miss. L.J. 799, 804-06 (1976). Because the municipality is ultimately liable in
such suits, some courts refused to grant relief in § 1983 cases although an official was joined.
See, e.g., Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 532 F.2d 259, 264-66 (2d Cir. 1976); Muzquiz v.
City of San Antonio, 518 F.2d 499, 501 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated, 438 U.S. 901 (1978) (remanded
in light of Monell). Contra, Thomas v. Ward, 529 F.2d 916, 920-21 (4th Cir. 1975); Burt v.
Board of Trustees, 521 F.2d 1201, 1204, 1206 (4th Cir. 1975). For a discussion of the official
capacity doctrine and its relation to the eleventh amendment sovereign immunity doctrine, see
notes 67-69 and accompanying text infra.
67. 208 U.S. 123 (1908).
68. Id. at 159-60. In so holding, the Court developed the fiction that the attorney general,
when acting unconstitutionally, could be treated as though he is "stripped" of his official character and subjected in his person to the consequences of his official conduct. Id. This fiction was
limited by the Supreme Court in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 561 (1974), in which the Court
held that official capacity suits seeking equitable relief against state officials could overcome the
eleventh amendment bar only if the relief sought was prospective, and not retrospective. Id. at
677.
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Young analogy, lower courts sustained a cause of action against a municipality if an officer of that body was included as a nominal party in the plead69
ings.
By way of dicta, 70 the Court in Kenosha had also left open the question
of whether there was a direct cause of action under the fourteenth amendment 71 and section 1331 of the Judicial Code. 72 Lower courts which had
allowed municipalities to be sued in this manner did so by analogy to the
Court's decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents. 73 The Bivens Court,
basing its decision on the principle that for every violation of a federally
guaranteed right there should be an appropriate remedy, held that federal
courts exercising general federal question jurisdiction can give monetary relief to parties whose fourth amendment rights had been violated. 74 A split
69. See Levin, supra note 44, at 1501 n.67. Regarding the official capacity doctrine, see
notes 66 & 67 and accompanying text supra. In Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), the
Court mandated that relief in an official capacity suit against the state be limited to prospective
relief. Id. at 677. Circuit courts have also applied this rationale to § 1983 actions. See, e.g.,
Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 528 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated, 438 U.S. 901 (1978)
(remanded in light of Monell). In following the eleventh amendment rationale, however, courts
in § 1983 cases apply to the word "person" the bifurcated approach that was categorically disapproved in Kenosha. See 412 U.S. at 513. See also Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 712 (1978). For a discussion of this point, see note 118 infra. For a general overview of
official capacity suits, Young, and § 1983, see, e.g., Levin, supra note 44, at 1496-518; Section
1983 and Federalism, supra note 3, at 1195-99. See also Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 528
F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated, 438 U.S. 901 (1978) (remanded in light of Monell), noted in
55 TEX. L. REV. 501 (1977); 47 Miss. L. REv. 799 (1976).
70. 412 U.S. at 513-15. The Court remanded the case to the district court to consider
whether the jurisdictional requirements of § 1331 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976),
were met. 412 U.S. at 513. For the text of § 1331(a), see note 72 infra.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). Section 1331(a) provides in pertinent part: "The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the
sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws
or treaties of the United States .
Id. § 1331(a).
73. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
74. Id. at 396-97. Justice Brennan, writing for the Bivens Court, stated that there should be
a federal remedy for every violation of a legal right where a federal statute provides for a
general right to sue for such violation. Id. at 396. Justice Brennan, however, states that before
granting the remedy, the Court should look to see if "special factors counselling hesitation in
the absence of affirmative action by Congress" are present. Id. For a discussion of Bivens and
direct causes of action under the fourteenth amendment, see, e.g., Hundt, supra note 43, at
778-88; Comment, Implying a Damage Remedy Directly Against Municipalities Directly Under
the Fourteenth Amendment: Congressional Action as an Obstacle to the Extension of the Bivens
Doctrine, 36 MD.L. REV. 123 (1976); Damage Remedies, supra note 43, at 925-29; Comment,
Municipality Liability for Constitutional Violations: Can You Fight City Hall? A Survey of the
Circuits, 16 DUQ. L. REV. 373 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Circuit Survey]. Prior to Monell, a
number of circuit courts had recognized the Bivens cause of action as applicable to
municipalities. See, e.g., Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 160-63 (2d Cir. 1978), vacated sub
nora. West Haven v. Mailet, 99 S. Ct. 554 (1978), on remand, Turpin v. Mailet, 591 F.2d 426
(2d Cir. 1979) (per curian) (remanded in light of Monell). On remand, the Second Circuit held
that since Monell facilitates a cause of action under § 1983, there is no need for the fourteenth
amendment cause of action. 591 F.2d at 427. See Amen v. City of Dearborn, 532 F.2d 554, 559
(6th Cir. 1976). The only circuit which had expressly rejected the Bivens cause of action with
respect to municipalities was the First Circuit. See Circuit Survey, supra, at 381-401, citing
Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 41-45 (1st Cir. 1977). For a pre-Monell survey of this issue with a
circuit by circuit breakdown, see Circuit Survey, supra, at 381-401. One author has intimated
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of authority has developed concerning whether municipalities can be held
75
under this theory. 76
liable on the basis of respondeat superior
The Supreme Court, in the seventeen years since its decision in
Monroe v. Pape, has thus consistently rejected challenges to the municipal
immunity rule. 77 It was in the face of these challenges that the Court de-

78
cided to reexamine the Monroe rule.

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Monell Analysis of the Legislative History of
1983 and the Sherman Amendment
In light of Monroe's exclusive reliance on the legislative history of section 1983 and the Sherman amendment as its basis for holding that
municipalities were immune from suit under section 1983, 79 the Monell
Court had to reexamine that history in order to overrule the municipal in-

that although few circuit courts have expressly recognized the cause of action, a reading of the
cases in this area shows that, prior to Monell, most courts would have accepted the Bivens
approach. Id. at 398. Even where the Bivens analogy had not been recognized, there existed
the possibility of suing municipalities under state law in federal court pursuant to the doctrine
of pendent party jurisdiction. See notes 56-59 and accompanying text supra. The question of
whether an action against municipalities under the fourteenth amendment exists, however, may
be an academic one, as the necessity of implying such an action is dubious in light of Monell.
See, e.g., Turpin v. Mailet, 591 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir., 1979) (per curiam); Molina v.
Richardson, 578 F.2d 846, 849-54 (9th Cir. 1978); Kedra v. City of Philadelphia, 454 F. Supp.
652 (E.D. Pa. 1978). But see Molina v. Richardson, 578 F.2d 846, 854-56 (9th Cir. 1978)
(Grant, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the continued vitality of the fourteenth amendment
cause of action after Monell, see notes 165-69 and accompanying text inffa.
An argument may be raised that the Court ultimately should have implied a cause of action
under the fourteenth amendment and § 1331 as opposed to overruling Monroe. Such an argument would be based on the fact that the jurisdictional amount requirement would protect the
courts from a torrent of trivial litigation. It is submitted that such an argument is unconvincing,
as a plaintiff has a cause of action against the individual officer under § 1983, and there is no
jurisdictional amount under § 1343(3). Even prior to Monell, therefore, if a plaintiff had wished
to bring a trivial lawsuit, he would merely sue the individual officer. See Damage Remedies,
supra note 43, at 960. Cf. Hundt, supra note 43, at 797 (no claim under § 1983 is too insignificant for federal jurisdiction).
75. For a discussion of the respondeat superior standard in civil rights actions, see notes
139-51 and accompanying text infra.
76. For cases recognizing the applicability of respondeat superior in the Bivens cause of
action, see, e.g., Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 435 F. Supp. 136, 148 (E. D. Pa. 1977);
Williams v. Brown, 398 F. Supp. 155, 160 (N.D. Ill. 1975). See also Hundt, supra note 43, at
795. Contra, Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 168 (2d Cir.), vacated sub nora. West Haven v.
Turpin, 99 S. Ct. 554 (1978), on remand, Turpin v. Mailet, 591 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1979) (per
curiam); McDonald v. Illinois, 557 F.2d 596, 604 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966
(1977). For an excellent discussion of the policy reasons against applying respondeat superior in
this instance, see, e.g., Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 164-67 (2d Cir.), vacated sub nom.
West Haven v. Turpin, 99 S. Ct. 554 (1978); on remand, Turpin v. Mallet, 591 F.2d 426 (2d
Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Adekalu v. New York City, 431 F. Supp. 812, 819-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
77. See note 52 supra.
78. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
79. See 365 U.S. at 187-91. For a discussion of Monroe, see notes 40-50 and accompanying
text supra.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol24/iss5/6

12

Klein: Federal Courts - 42 U.S.C. 1983 - Suing Municipalities under 42 U
1020

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

24: p. 1008

munity rule. In so doing, the Court accepted the views of the scholars who
80
believe that the Monroe Court misinterpreted the debates.
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Monell, found that nothing
in the congressional debates of the Sherman amendment led to the conclusion that Congress had intended that municipalities be immune from liability
under section 1983.81 Justice Brennan supported this conclusion by contending that the Sherman amendment was rejected not because Congress
had intended that municipalities be immune from section 1983 liability, but
rather because Congress had correctly perceived the amendment as an unconstitutional imposition of obligations upon the states by the federal government. 8 2 The majority further contended that although the first two

80. 436 U.S. at 665. In accepting those views, the Monell Court stated: "A fresh analysis of
debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and particularly of the case law which each side mustered in its support, shows, however, that Monroe incorrectly equated the 'obligation, [contained in the Sherman amendment] ... with 'civil liability' [under § 1983]." Id. For a discussion of the views of the various authors concerning the Monroe interpretation of the relevant
legislative history, see notes 44-49 and accompanying text supra.
81. See 436 U.S. at 683. Justice Brennan stated: "It is readily apparent that nothing said in
debate on the Sherman amendment would have prevented holding a municipality liable under §
1 [§ 1983] of the Civil Rights Act for its own violations of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
82. Id. at 679. In so concluding, Justice Brennan viewed the constitutional arguments of
both the supporters and opponents of the Sherman amendment. Id. at 669. The majority
pointed out that the debates on the Sherman amendment focused on whether Congress had the
power to create an obligation that municipalities keep the peace. Id. See CONG. GLOBE, supra
note 22, at 751-52, 754-66, 787-95, 798-800, 67 App. According to the Court, the proponents of
the Sherman amendment relied on Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842), wherein
the Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute implementing the fugitive from justice provision and fugitive slave provision of article four of the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST.,
art. 4, § 2. See 436 U.S. at 672-83, citing Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S, (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
'The Court in Prigg reasoned that when the Constitution guaranteedl a right, it in turn required
a remedy to enforce that right. See 41 U.S. at 616. Building upon this premise, Representative
Shellabarger, a major proponent of the Sherman amendment, argued that since the fourteenth
amendment guaranteed certain rights, municipal liability was an appropriate means of enforcing
those rights. See 436 U.S. at 672, citing CONG. GLOBE, supra note 22, at 751 (remarks of Rep.
Shellabarger). Representative Shellabarger, in claiming that imposing obligations on
municipalities was constitutionally valid, also relied on Board of Commn'rs v. Aspinwall, 65 U.S.
(24 How.) 376 (1861). Aspinwall was the first of many cases upholding the power of the federal
courts to enforce the contract clause, U.S. CoNST. art. 1, § 10, cl.1, against municipalities. 65
U.S. at 383-85. See 436 U.S. at 672.
The Monell Court used the remarks of Congressman Blair in analyzing the arguments
against the Sherman amendment. See 436 U.S. at 673-75, quoting CONG. GLOBE, supra note
22, at 795 (remarks of Rep. Blair). The Court, in analyzing Representative Blair's remarks,
stated that the major concern of the opponents of the amendment was
that the local units of government upon which the amendment fastened liability were not
obligated to keep the peace at state law and further that the Federal Government could
not constitutionally require local governments to create police forces, whether this requirement was levied directly, or indirectly by imposing damages for breach of the peace
on municipalities.
436 U.S. at 673. The opponents of the Sherman amendment based their constitutional argument
on the then prevalent doctrine of coordinate sovereignty, which placed "limits onlthe enumerated powers of the National Government in favor of protecting State prerogatives." Id. 676,
citing Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
539 (1842). The opponents believed that both Collector and Prigg stood for the proposition that
.Congress could not insist that "states . ..provide means to carry into effect the duties of the
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drafts of the Sherman amendment probably would have been unconstitutional legislation, 83 section 1983 did not suffer from the same deficiency. 84
The Court therefore reasoned that Congress would have had no constitutional objection to holding municipalities liable under section 1983.85
Having concluded that Congress would have had no constitutional objection to imposing municipal liability under section 1983, the Monell Court
then faced the issue of whether Congress intended that municipalities be
treated as "persons" for purposes of the Act. 86 The Court found that Congress did intend that a municipality be held accountable for its deprivations
of constitutional rights under section 1983.87 This finding was based ol the

national government." 436 U.S. at 677, quoting Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539,
615-16 (1842) (footnote omitted).
In Monell, Justice Brennan therefore concluded that the House had rejected the first two
versions of the Sherman amendment because it believed that the amendment, "by putting
municipalities to the Hobson's choice of keeping the peace or paying civil damages, attempted
to impose obligations on municipalities by indirection that could not be imposed directly." 436
U.S. at 679. Justice Brennan also stated that there was ample support for such a view. Id. at
682, citing Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871); Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24
How.) 66 (1861); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). For a general discussion of
the legislative history of § 1983 and the Sherman amendment, see notes 22-39 and accompanying text supra.
83. 436.U.S. at 679. See also notes 80-82 and accompanying text supra.
84. 436 U.S. at 679. In support of this conclusion, Justice Brennan stated: "First, opponents
[of the Sherman amendment] expressly distinguished between imposing an obligation to keep
the peace and merely imposing civil liability for damages on a municipality that was obligated
by State law to keep the peace, but which had not in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id. Justice Brennan, relying on the remarks of Representative Poland during the debates of the
Sherman amendment, contended that the opponents of the amendments had recognized that
municipalities could constitutionally be held liable for civil rights violations. See id., citing
CONG. GLOBE, supra note 22, at 794. Representative Poland, whose views were considered
controlling in Monroe, 365 U.S. at 190, agreed that the federal courts could entertain suits
alleging that a municipality was liable for using its authorized powers in violation of the Constitution. See 436 U.S. at 680, citing CONG. GLOBE, supra note 22, at 794 (remarks of Rep.
Poland).
Justice Brennan also concluded that liability under § 1983 would not have been deemed to
have been unconstitutional under the legal theories prevailing in 1871. See 436 U.S. at 692. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on the doctrine of coordinate sovereignty as set out in
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). The Court interpreted this theory as placing
no limits on the power of the federal courts to act affirmatively in order to vindicate federal
rights. 436 U.S. at 680. See note 82 supra. Since § 1983 was an act which sought to confer
jurisdiction on the federal courts to entertain suits seeking to hold those acting under color of
law liable for their civil rights violations, there was, the Court concluded, "no reason to suppose
that opponents of the Sherman amendment would have found any constitutional barrier to 9 1
[§ 1983] suits against municipalities." 436 U.S. at 682. Justice Brennan supported his observations by pointing out that the same Court which adhered to the doctrine of coordinate
sovereignty had no hesitation in enforcing the contract clause against municipalities. Id. at 681
& n.40. As a result, he concluded that the jursidiction granted under § 1 [§1983] was analogous
to the diversity jurisdiction under which the contract clause was enforced, and therefore there
was no constitutional barrier. Id,
85. 436 U.S. at 683. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated that "it is readily apparent
that nothing said in debate on the Sherman amendment would have prevented holding a municipality liable under § 1 [§ 1983] of the Civil Rights Act for its own violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id.
86. Id. at 683-89.
87. Id. at 690.
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following considerations: 1) the broad remedial goals of section 1983;88 2)
statements by members of Congress that actions by cities were redressable
under section 1983; 89 3) the state of the law concerning municipal corporations in 1871; 9o and 4) the definition of the word "person" in the Dictionary
Act of 1871,91 which provided that unless the context indicated to the contrary, the word "person" may be applied to "bodies politic and corporate." 92
Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion, 93 disagreed with the majority's outright rejection of the Monroe Court's interpretation of the congressional intent regarding municipal immunity under section 1983. 94 Conceding that the Monroe interpretation may have been incorrect, 95 Justice
Rehoquist nevertheless contended that Congress' rejection of the original
versions of the Sherman amendment was arguably an expression of congressional intent to reject municipal liability under section 1983.96 Since no
clear evidence of Congress' intent concerning this issue exists, the dissent
questioned the propriety of overruling Monroe on the basis of the relevant
97
legislative history.
88. Id. at 685. The Court utilized the statements of Representative Shellabarger, who concluded that § I [§ 1983] should be given a liberal construction. Ild., citing CONG. GLOBE, supra
note 22, at 68 app. (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger). The Court then stated that other members
of Coogress agreed that § 1 [§ 19831 was a broad remedv for violations of federally protected
civil rights. See 436 U.S. at 685 & n.45. The Court therefore conclud(ed that since
municipalities could create the harms which § 1 1.§ 1983] was intended to remedy, there would
have been no reason for Congress to have excluded municipalities from the section. See id. at
685-86.
89. 436 U.S. at 686-87, cititg CONG. GLOBE, soupra note 22, at 84 app. (remarks of Rep.
Bingham). Justice Rehuquist took issue with the Court concerning this point, claiming that
Representative Bingham never directly related his remarks to the provisions of' § 1983. See 436
U.S. at 721-22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
90. 436 U.S. at 687-88. The Court stated that "by 1871, it was well understood that corporatinos should be treated as natural persons for virtually all purposes of constitutional and statutory analysis." Id. at 687. The Court further relied on Cowles v. Mercer County, 74 U.S. (7

Wall.) 118, 121-22 (1896), in which this doctrine was extended to municipal corporations. See
436 U.S. at 688, citing Cowles v. Mercer County, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 118, 121-22 (1869). The
Court indicated that the legal status of municipal corporations was known to Congress in 1871.
See 436 U.S. at 688 & n. 5 0.
91. 436 U.S. at 688 & n.50, quoting Dictionary Act of 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431.
92. Dictionary Act of 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431. The )ictionary Act was designed to
define and interpret various terms for Congress. Id. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 190
n.47 (1961). See also 436 U.S. at 689. In Monroe, Justice Douglas stated that the adoption of

the definition in the Dictionary Act was merely perluissive. See 365 U.S. at 190-91. The Court
in Monell noted, however, that pursuant to judicial interpretation, municipal corporations were
included within the phrase "bodies politic and corporate." See 436 U.S. at 689, citing Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 18 F. Cas. 393, 394 (C.C.N.D. III. 1873).
93. Justice Rehnquist was joined by Chief Justice Burger in his dissent.
94. 436 U.S. at 714 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191
(1961).
95. 436 U.S. at 722 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 723 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist stated: "Whatever the merits of
the constitutional arguments raised against it, the fact remains that Congress rejected the concept of municipal tort liability on the only occasion in which the question was explicitly pre-

sented." Id. For a discussion of how Justice Rehnquist views the ambiguity of the Court's
historical analysis and its relationship to considerations of stare decisis, see notes 98-100 and
accompanying text itfra.
97. 436 U.S. at 722-24 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Powell also contended that although the historical weakness of Monroe was evident from analysis of the relevant legislative
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It is submitted that Justice Rehnquist's dissent highlights the analytical

problem of using legislative history as a basis for overruling Monroe. 9 8
While it does seem that Congress' rejection of municipal liability under the
Sherman amendment does not expressly evidence an intent to reject munic-

ipal liability under section 1983, 99 it is submitted that, contrary to the majority opinion in.Monell, it is quite unclear whether Congress affirmatively intended to hold municipalities liable.00
B. The Monell Analysis of Considerations of Stare Decisis
Although the Court recognized the principle that "stare decisis has
more force in statutory analysis than in constitutional adjudication because,
in the former situation, Congress can correct .. . [the Court's] mistakes
through legislation," 101 it nevertheless decided to overrule in Monell, listing
four reasons that rejected considerations of stare decisis as colltrolling. 102
Initially, the Court observed that the Monroe holding itself had been a dehistory, the gravity of overruling as important a precedent as Monroe could not rest on legislative history alone. Id. at 708-14. (Powell, J.,concurring).
98. Id. at 719-24 (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting). As one author has commented: "[l1egislative
history is a poor bulwark for any statutory interpretation since the wealth of conflicting evidence
legitimates inconsistent conclusions." Kates & Kouba, supra note 27, at 135. Another author has
stated:
The text of the statute is subjected to analysis into its minutest parts and the nicest
inferences are drawn from what was said to determine legislative thinking on what was
not said. Committee reports and hearings, legislative debates, discarded bills,
chronologies of amendment are picked clean. In this treasure trove what judge could not
find the answer to his statutory problem? Perhaps only the least imaginative.
Id., quoting Bishin, The Law Finders: An Essay in Statutory Interpretation, 38 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 3 (1965).
99. For a general discussion of the Sherman amendment, see notes 22-39 & 79-97 and accompanying text supra.
100. See 436 U.S. at 719-24 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the ambiguity of
the legislative history, see notes 93-99 and accompanying text supra.
101. 436 U.S. at 695, citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 n.14 (1974). The Court in
Edelman stated that because it was dealing with a constitutional question, it was less constrained by principles of stare decisis. 415 U.S. at 671. This principle is founded upon the
following considerations, enunciated by Justice Brandeis:
Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that
the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right. This is commonly true
even where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can be had by
legislation. But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through
legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions.
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(footnotes omitted). The majority in Monell, while accepting the basic soundness of this principle, cited it as also being authority for the proposition that stare decisis should not be mechanically applied. 436 U.S. at 695. Within Justice Brandeis' statement is a footnote which supports
the view that the legislative-constitutional differentiation is not absolute; Justice Brandeis cites a
multitude of cases wherein the "Court has, in matters deemed important, occasionally overruled
its earlier decisions, although correction might have been secured by legislation." 285 U.S. 393,
406-07 n.1 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). But cf. 436 U.S. at 714-15 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(Monell is not a proper case to overcome the general principle). For a general discussion of
considerations of stare decisis, see notes 102-08 and accompanying text infra.
102. See 436 U.S. at 695-700.
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parture from precedent,103 stating that "it can scarcely be said that Monroe
is so consistent with the warp and woof of civil rights law as to be beyond
question." 104 The Court also urged that while school boards should not
logically be excepted from the Monroe doctrine, Congress has refused to
extend the benefits of Monroe immunity to school boards. 10 5 Furthermore, the
Court flatly rejected an assertion by dissenting Justice Rehnquist that the
municipal immunity principle should be reaffirmed because municipalities
which have heavily relied on Monroe would be unjustly injured by a reversal of
that decision. 10 6 Finally, the Court concluded that the Monroe Court's interpretation of the relevant legislative history was clearly incorrect, 10 7 and
therefore stare decisis did not mandate adherence to Monroe. 108
1. Monroe, Precedent, and the School Board Cases
As support for the contention that Monroe represented a departure from
precedent, the Monell Court cited five cases 509 in which jurisdiction to hear
substantive section 1983 claims against a municipality had been granted pursuant to section 1983's jurisdictional counterpart.110

As Justice Rehnquist

103. Id. at 695.
104. Id. at 696. For an analysis of this contention, see notes 109-14 and accompanying text
infra. The Court also pointed out that "the constitutional defect that led to the rejection of the
Sherman amendment would not have distinguished between municipalities and school boards,
each of which is an instrumentality of state administration." 436 U.S. at 695-96. For a discussion
of the school board cases and Monroe, see notes 109-21 and accompanying text infra.
105. 436 U.S. at 696. The Court determined that Congress had rejected efforts to strip the
federal courts of jurisdiction over school boards at various times during the busing furor. Id. at
696-99 & nn.62-63. The Court interpreted this congressional response as being consistent with
the Court's previous decisions that school boards were persons under § 1983. Id. at 696. For a
general discussion of the school board cases, see note 104 supra, and notes 109-21 and accompanying text infra.
106. 436 U.S. at 699-700. For a discussion of the reliance issue, see notes 132-38 and accompanying text infra.
107. 436 U.S. at 700-01.
108. Id. at 700. The Court quoted the test for determining the propriety of overruling a
statutory decision, as enunciated by Justice Harlan in Monroe: "[Ilt [must] appear beyond doubt
from the legislative history . .. that [Monroe] misapprehended the meaning of the [section]."
Id., citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 192 (1961) (Harlan, J.,concurring). For a discussion
of the Monell analysis of the legislative history, see notes 79-100 and accompanying text supra.
Justice Powell agreed with the majority that Monell was a proper case to overrule a statutory
construction. 436 U.S. at 708 (Powell, J., concurring). For a discussion of Justice Powell's concurring opinion, see notes 122-31 and accompanying text infra.
109. 436 U.S. at 695, citing Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam)
(court exercised jurisdiction over a municipality); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157,
161 (1943) (court exercised jurisdiction over a claim against a municipality in order to dismiss
plaintiffs claims for injunctive relie); Hannan v. City of Haverhill, 120 F.2d 87, 88 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 641 (1941) (First Circuit upheld the district court's assumption of jurisdiction against a municipality); City of Manchester v. Leiby, 117 F.2d 661, 664 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 313 U.S. 562 (1941) (district court had jurisdiction to enjoin enforcement of a municipal
ordinance which plaintiffs alleged violated their constitutional rights); Northwestern Fertilizing
Co. v. Hyde Park, 18 F. Cas. 393, 394 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1873) (a corporation is a person who may
sue a municipality).
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976). For the relevant text of this statute, see note 24 supra.
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indicated, however, such a reading of these cases is misleading 1 because in
none of the cases cited by the Monell Court 112 was the issue of a federal
court's jurisdiction to hear a section 1983 claim against a municipality ever
raised.l 3 As sub silentio determinations of jurisdiction are not binding precedent,"14 the Court was thus free to consider the jurisdictional question in
Monroe.
The Monell Court also found it very difficult to reconcile Monroe with a
series of subsequent school board cases in which it had granted jurisdiction
to hear section 1983 claims. 115 The Court argued that due to the inconsistency between Monroe and the school board cases, precedent required that
Monroe be overruled. "1 6 Such reliance on the school board cases appears to

111. See 436 U.S. at 715 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist stated: "The Court's
first assertion, that Monroe 'was a departure from prior practice,' . . . is patently erroneous."
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
112. For a list of these cases, see note 109 supra.
113. Id. See 436 U.S. at 715-16 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). It is submitted that Justice
Rehnquist is correct as to this point. While all of the cases which the Court cited involved a suit
against a municipality under § 1983, in none of these cases was the issue of the municipality's
amenability to suit ever raised. See cases cited note 109 supra.
114. See 436 U.S. at 716, (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528,
535 n.5 (1974) (Court is not bound by previous sub silentio decisions granting jurisdiction under
§ 1343 in order to hear welfare recipient's claims). See also Florida Lime & Avocado Growers,
Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 87-88 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (Court should not have
been bound by sub silentio determination that there was a direct appeal from three judge
federal district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 where a state statute was sought to be enjoined
on both federal constitutional and non constitutional grounds); King Mfg. Co. v. City of Augusta, 277 U.S. 100, 134-35 n.21 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (Court should not be bound by
decisions granting jurisdiction sub silentio to hear appeals from state courts sustaining municipal
ordinances); United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 172 (1805) (Court not bound by sub
silentio grant of appellate jurisdiction in a criminal case).
While Justice Rehnquist states that sub silentio determinations are not binding on the
Court, it is interesting to note the precedential effect he gives to cases in which issues were
decided without the benefit of argument. See 436 U.S. at 711-18 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Powell claimed that Monroe was not entitled to full precedential effect because the
issue of municipal immunity was neither orally argued nor briefed. Id. at 708 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist answers this claim by stating that such reasoning would "cast ...
doubt upon each of our cases, from Marbury v. Madison . . . forward, in which the explicit
ground of decision 'was never actually briefed or argued.' " 436 U.S. at 718 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
115. See 436 U.S. at 663. The Court had heard a number of cases against school boards in
which § 1983 and § 1343 provided the only basis of jurisdiction. See id. n.6, citing Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 636 (1974) (Court assumed jurisdiction to determine
whether a school board's mandatory termination provisions for pregnant employees were unconstitutional); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 191 (1973) (Court had jurisdiction to
determine that intentional segregative school board actions in meaningful portion of school system created prima facie case of unlawful segregated design on part of school authorities); Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 5 (1971) (Court assumed jurisdiction in a
school desegretation case); Northcross v. Board of Educ., 397 U.S. 232, 233 (1969) (school
desegregation case); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969)
(Court had jurisdiction to issue an injunction against a regulation which forbade the wearing of
armbands during the Vietnam war); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671-72 (1963)
(Court assumed jurisdiction in a school desegregation case). The Court also lists a number of
other cases which were brought under § 1983 against a school board. See 436 U.S. at 663 n.5.
116. See 436 U.S. at 696-99. The Court further argued that "the principle of blanket immunity cannot be cabined short of school boards." Id. at 696.
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be inapposite, however, because the school board cases, like the five cases
previously discussed, 117 did not involve the issue of municipal liability under
section 1983.118
It is therefore submitted that the majority overstated its position when
it determined that Monroe was a contradiction of precedent. 119 Nevertheless, the Monell Court was correct in considering the school board cases
because the exercise of jurisdiction in those cases cannot be reconciled with
Monroe. 120 Indeed, as the Court points out, Congress has rejected attempts to deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction over the school
boards. 12 1 It is thus submitted that to the extent of any inconsistency between the school board cases and Monroe, the policy embodied in the school
board cases counsels in favor of ultimately dispensing with the Monroe doctrine of municipal immunity.
2. Justice Powell and the pragmaticjustifications for Monell
Despite this policy consideration, it would seem from the foregoing that
the stringent requirements for overturning a prior statutory construction
were not present in Monell. 122 A strong argument can be made that the

117. See cases cited note 109 supra.
118. 436 U.S. at 711 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell stated in reference to the school
board cases that "the Court has assumed sub silentio that some local government entitites could
be sued under § 1983." Id. Justice Rehnquist stated, however, that the school board cases are
distinguishable on the basis of the Ex Parte Young official capacity doctrine. See id. at 716-17
n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Powell pointed out that while some of the cases may be
distinguishable on the basis of the official capacity doctrine, there is a problem in reconciling
cases in which damages were awarded against a school board. Id. at 711 (Powell, J., concurring), citing Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969). The awarding of damages in these
cases would seem to be barred by the Court's holding in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974), which barred retroactive relief against a state. See 436 U.S. at 711-12 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell stated that if the official capacity analogy were still applicable, it would
create tension with the Court's holding in Kenosha. Id. The Court's rejection of the bifurcated
approach in Kenosha was reaffirmed in Monel. See id. 701 n.66. That approach held that the
word "person" in § 1983 suits would have but one meaning regardless of the type of relief
sought. 412 U.S. at 513. The use of the official capacity doctrine and its recognition of the
prospective-retroactive dichotomy would, therefore, "fly in the face" of Kenosha. See 436 U.S.
at 711-12 (Powell, J., concurring).
It is interesting to note that Justice Rehnquist was the author of the Court's opinion in
Kenosha. It is therefore submitted that the use of the official capacity doctrine to sue a municipality no longer survives Monell. For a discussion of the official capacity doctrine, see notes
66-69 and accompanying text supra.
119. See 436 U.S. at 695. For a discussion of this issue, see notes 109-18 supra.
120. See 436 U.S. at 695. There is nothing in Monroe or the relevant legislative debates
which would show that some municipal entities could be sued and others could not. See id.
121. See id.
122. Regarding the test for overruling a statutory construction, see notes 101 & 107-08 and
accompanying text supra. Indeed, most authors have not gone as far as the Court in Monell in
definitely stating that Congress intended that municipalities be liable under § 1983. See, e.g.,
Comment, supra note 63, at 119 ("Congress was at least neutral to the possibility of a public
entity being a 'person' "); Developing Governmental Liability, supra note 43, at 1206 (stating
only that Congress did not disapprove of using the word "person" to encompass a municipality
under certain circumstances); Levin, supra note 44, at 1531 (legislative history shows that the
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Court should have delayed such action pending a specific showing of congressional disfavor with Monroe. 123 Justice Powell's concurring opinion,
however, discusses the factors that necessitated a resolution of the municipal
immunity issue in Monell. 124 Recognizing that the result in Monroe created
an "anomalous result" when viewed in light of the purposes of section
1983,125 Justice Powell alluded to the fact that the Monroe decision 126 had
led to numerous lower court attempts to circumvent that case. 127 It is thus
submitted that Justice Powell indicated the actual reason for the necessity of
overruling Monroe. 128

Prior to Monell, the Supreme Court was faced with myriad attempts to
circumvent Monroe, 129 and every time the Court rejected one method,
another circumvention method would arise. 130 It is therefore suggested that
Sherman amendment debates did not suggest that § 1983 should restrict in any way the remedies that courts may decree to redress the consequent injury). See generally Kates & Kouba,
supra note 27, at 136. In criticizing the Court's use of legislative history in Monroe, one author
has made the following statement, which is equally applicable to the Monell Court's interpretation of the relevant legislative history: "The validity of the Court's holding thus depends on the
degree of acceptance given these ancient debates by each analyst. Given this weakness, the
Court's sole reliance upon the debates over the Sherman Amendment is inadequate." Id. As the
Court in Monell offered no new historical evidence in support of its conclusion, it is suggested
that Congress' intent as to the liability of municipalities remains ambiguous. See 436 U.S. at
660-702.
123. A bill is presently before Congress, its purpose being
to amend section 1979 [1983] of the Revised Statutes to provide that States,
municipalities, and agencies or units of government thereof, may be sued under the provisions of such section; to establish rules of liability with respect to such States,
municipalities, and agencies or units of government thereof; and for other purposes.
S. 35, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978). Since 1962, various bills have been introduced with the
purpose of overruling Monroe. For a list of the bills, see Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 177
n.32 (2d Cir. 1978), vacated sub norn. West Haven v. Turpin, 99 S.Ct. 554 (1978), on remand,
Turpin v. Mailet, 591 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
124. 436 U.S. at 704-14 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Stevens concurred without opinion,
joining only part I (legislative analysis), part III (stare decisis), and part V (reversal of court of
appeals) of the Court's opinion. See id. at 714 (Stevens, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 705-07 (Powell, J., concurring).
126. Id. Justice Powell characterized the result in Monroe, which was rejected in Monell, as
follows: "The Court correctly rejects a view of the legislative history that would produce the
anonalous result of immunizing local government units from monetary liability for action directly causing a constitutional deprivation, even though such actions may be fully consistent
with, and thus not remediable under state law." Id. at 707 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
127. See id. at 708-13 (Powell, J., concurring). For a discussion of Monroe and the various
attempts made to circumvent its holding, see notes 51-78 and accompanying text supra. While
Justice Powell does not directly address the lack of judicial compliance, he does in fact discuss
the problem of a number of circumvention methods. See 436 U.S. at 708-13 (Powell, J,,concurring).

128. See 436 U.S. at 708-13 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell recognized that the Court
could no longer avoid the question of a direct cause of action under the fourteenth amendment,
nor avoid the fact that the official capacity exception created tension with the holding in
Kenosha. See id. at 712 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell contended that rather than
deciding the various issues which had developed under the circumvention attempts, "the better
course is to confess error and set the record straight." Id. at 713 (Powell, J., concurring).
129. See notes 40-78 and accompanying text supra.
130. For a discussion of the ways in which the Court dealt with a number of circumvention
attempts, see notes 40-78 and accompanying text supra.
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the majority opinion is much more understandable if viewed as the Supreme
Court's reaction to this situation. The Monell holding is far more defensible
as a recognition that Monroe was analytically unsound, as evidenced by the
circumvention attempts, rather than as a discourse on legislative history.131
It is submitted that the Court's decision would be far more supportable if
the Court had based its decision more on concern for certainty and equal
application of the law under section 1983 than on legislative history and
dubious precedent.
3. Justice Rehnquist's dissent and the municipality reliance argument
Justice Rehnquist argued in dissent that the Monell Court totally disregarded the right of municipalities to rely on the Court's adherence to stare
decisis, 132 stating that the Court in Monell had "obliterate[d] . . . legitimate

expectations [of municipalities]."

133

The majority countered this contention

by stating that "municipalities simply cannot arrange their affairs on an as-

sumption that they can violate constitutional rights indefinitely." 134
It is submitted that while the majority's assertion that a municipality
cannot act under the assumption that it can violate constitutional rights is
self-evident, Justice Rehnquist's considerations of the potential financial burden Monell imposes on municipalities are also compelling. 135 Both of these
meritorious positions could have been furthered by limiting Monell to prospective application,' 3 6 and the Court's failure to do so may lead to serious
economic consequences.13 7 It is suggested that at a time when many cities
131. It is submitted that the Court's interpretation of the legislative history is somewhat open
to question. The ambiguity of statutory interpretation through legislative history would seem to
counsel against overturning a prior statutory construction on that basis alone. See 436 U.S. at
719-24 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also notes 107-08 and accompanying text supra. It is
suggested, however, that when the lack of judicial adherence to the Court's holding in Monroe
is combined with the questionable statutory interpretation in that case, the decision in Monell
becomes more understandable.
132. See 436 U.S. at 714-24 (Rehuquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist contended that
"[s]ince Monroe, municipalities have had the right to expect that they would not be held liable
retroactively for their officers [sic] failure to predict this Court's recognition of new constitutional rights." Id. at 717 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
133. Id. at 717 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 700. More fully, the Court rejected this argument by stating: "Municipalities can
assert no reliance claim which can support an absolute immunity....
Indeed, municipalities
simply cannot 'arrange their affairs' on the assumption that they can violate constitutional rights
indefinitely since injunctive suits against local officials under § 1983 would prohibit any such
arrangement.- Id.
135. Id. at 724 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
136. See, e.g., Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969) (per curiamo) (decision
invalidating a "property taxpayer" limitation on the franchise is entitled only to prospective
effect); Hallidav v. United States, 394 U.S. 831, 832 (1969) (per curiamo) (setting forth criteria for
prospective application); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733 (1966) (limiting Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Escobedo v. United States, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), to prospective application); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965) (limiting Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961), to prospective application, and establishing the principle that "the Constitution
neither prohibits nor requires retroactive effect").
137. It is impossible to determine at this point what the ultimate cost to municipalities will
be. Had the Court limited its holding to prospective application, however, municipalities would
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are in the midst of financial crisis, 138 the Court should have shown some
sensitivity to this situation.
C. The Impact of Monell: The Present Scope of Liability of Municipalities
Although the Monell Court specifically left open the question of the
contours of municipal liability under section 1983,139 it did resolve two
points concerning the scope of that liability. Initially, the Court held that
relief is not only available when the constitutional deprivation steins from al
officially enunciated policy, 140 but also that "local governments . .. may be

sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental 'custom' even though such a custon has not received formal approval through
the body's official decision making channels." 141 The Court also concluded
that "a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a
on a respondeat superior theory." 142
torifeasor - or, in other words ....
have been able to obtain insurance against liability for most possible civil rights violations. Cf.
436 U.S. at 717 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (numerous insurance policies and indemnity ordinances were issued under the assumption that Monroe would not be overruled). Prior to
Monell, there was very little insurance coverage for civil rights liability. See Hagarty, Insurance
Coverage and Civil Rights Litigation, 27 FED'N OF INS. COUNSEL 3, 11 (1976). For an interesting hypothetical of how the imposition of municipal liability could lead to fiscal disaster, see
Damage Remedies, supra note 43, at 958.
138. For a discussion of the urban fiscal crisis, see generally U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, July 3, 1978, at 59-60; THE AMERICAN CITY, May, 1975, at 20; FORTUNE, March 1977, at
194-98. One may argue, however, that the Court's refusal to find liability on a respondeat
superior basis evidenced a concern for the fiscal plight of municipalities. See 436 U.S. at 691.
The Second Circuit viewed the respondeat superior issue as a fiscal safeguard in a recent case
brought directly under the fourteenth amendment. See Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 165-66
(2d Cir.), vacated sub nomn. West Haven v. Turpin, 99 S. Ct. 554 (1978), on remand, Turpin v.
Mailet, 591 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
139. See 436 U.S. at 694-95. The Court stated that "we have no occasion to address, and do
not address, what the full contours of municipal liability under § 1983 may be." Id. at 695.
140. Id. at 690.
141. Id. at 691. The Court stated that this result is mandated by the very terms of the
statute. Id., quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970). In Adickes,
Justice Harlan said: "Congress included customs and usages ... [in § 1983] because of the
persistent and widespread discriminatory practices of state officials .... Although not authorized by written law, such practices could well be so permanent and well settled as to
constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force of law." Id. (footnote omitted).
142. 436 U.S. at 691 (emphasis by the Court). Justice Brennan, in rejecting vicarious liability
of municipalities under § 1983, specified the following justifications for the imposition of the
doctrine: 1) accidents may be reduced if the employer is held liable, id. at 693, citing W.
PRossEs, LAW OF TORTS 459 (4th ed. 1971); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §
26.3, at 1368-69 (1956); and 2) the costs of accidents should be spread to the community as a
whole on an insurance theory. 436 U.S. at 693-94, citing W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 459 (4th
ed. 1971); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAWS OF TORTS § 26.5, at 1370-74 (1956). Justice

Brennan suggested that both of the aforementioned justifications were stated as rationales for
the Sherman amendment itself, thus making it clear that Congress rejected the notion of municipal vicarious liability under § 1983. See 436 U.S. at 694. For a persuasive analysis contending
that the rejection of the Sherman amendment was in fact a rejection of respondeat superior, see
Levin, supra note 44, at 1519-31. Another justification often given for limiting municipal liability by precluding liability under respondeat superior is that such a narrowing of liability protects
city treasuries from excessive depletion due to civil rights suits. See note 138 supra.
On the other hand, it has been argued that liability should be imposed on the basis of
respondeat superior, for without such liability, § 1983 will continue to be an ineffective remedy.
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Pursuant to Monell, therefore, section 1983 liability will be imposed on a
municipality only when it has been alleged and proven that the municipality
actually caused the civil rights violation. 143 The formulation of the standards
to be employed in determining when a municipality is responsible for a
given civil rights violation will undoubtedly he the key post-Monell issue. 144
While this question is currently unresolved, the case law seems to indicate
the emergence of a limited view of municipal liability. 145
In limiting liability to situations wherein the municipality causes the
violation, the Monell Court relied heavily on the restrictive holding of Rizzo
v. Goode. 146 In Rizzo, the Court held that injunctive relief could not be
granted against upper echelon municipal employees who had played no affirmative part in depriving the plaintiffs of their constitutional rights.147 The
difficulty in finding liability under Rizzo is further illustrated by Lewis v.
Hyland. 148 In Lewis, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-

See, e.g., Hundt, supra note 43, at 795; Damage Remedies, supra note 43, at 995. For a discussion of the inefficacy of § 1983 prior to Monell, see note 43 supra. One author has stated the
following regarding the Bivens fourteenth amendment analogy:
The first policy argument in favor of municipal damages liability is that a municipality, rather than the individual officers who are the defendants in section 1983 suits, can
best afford to pay damages. In the event that the officers are judgment-proof, municipal
liability would guarantee payment from the deep pocket of the public fisc. It is arguable,
however, that a municipality should only be required to pay such awards if it is in some
way responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right. The problem is solved by
applying the tort theory of respondeat superior: a municipality should be held liable for
the misconduct of its employees when that misconduct is in furtherance of the employer's
purposes and not purely private in nature. Because deprivations of civil rights can be
viewed as constitutional to'ts, it is proper to borrow this doctrine from tort theory.
Hundt, supra, note 43, at 779 (footnotes omitted) (regarding municipal liability in the context of
the fourteenth amendment). See also Damage Remedies, supra note 43, at 955. Consider also
the following remarks of another author who does not favor the imposition of liability on a
respondeat superior basis: "Admittedly, municipal immunity from vicarious liability will often
have the effect of denying any substantial compensation to the proven victim of a constitutional
tort.
...
Levin, supra note 44, at 1535.
143. See 436 U.S. at 692, citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976). For a discussion of Rizzo, see notes 146-51 and accompanying text infra.
144. See Levin, supra note 44, at 1539 (calling for a common law development of the issue).
145. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379-81 (1976). Most of the cases that have discussed
this problem since MAonell have done so in terms of the Bivens cause of action, and have held
that there is no vicarious liability. See, e.g., Turpin v. Mailet, .579 F.2d 152, 168 (2d Cir.),
vacated sub nom. West Haven v. Turpin, 99 S. Ct. 554 (1978), on remand, Turpin v. Mailet,
591 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Molina v. Richardson, 578 F.2d 846, 848 (9th Cir.
1978); Kedra v. City of Philadelphia, 454 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Pa. 1978). For a discussion of the
issue of respondeat superior and the Bivens cause of action, see notes 76 & 145 and accompanying text supra.
146. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
147. Id. at 367, 376. In Rizzo, the Court rejected respondent's attempts to hold high municipal policymakers subject to injunctions under § 1983 for their failure to act in the face of a
statistically proven pattern of police abuse. Id. at 376. The Court stated that a statistically
proven pattern of police abuse is not enough to make higher echelon municipal officers subject
to injunctions, but that there must be proof that these officers deprived the plaintiff of his
constitutional rights. Id. at 376-77. See aLso 436 U.S. at 692-93. For a discussion of the difficult
problems of proof under Rizzo, see notes 148-51 and accompanying text infra.
148. 554 F.2d 93 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 931 (1977).
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cuit held that a finding of thirty-four constitutional violations by New Jersey
state troopers out of a total of sixty-six incidents 149 did not constitute a "deliberate pattern and practice." 150 In light of these holdings, it is submitted
that Monell's effect on municipal immunity will be limited because express
municipal policies or customs will seldom be the apparent cause of a civil
rights violation. 151

Furthermore, the Moell Court left open the question of whether there
should be a qualified municipal immunity under section 1983.152 Such a limitation may be predicated upon immunities available under state law15 3 or
the good faith immunities available to officials pursuant to section 1983.154
In Ohland v. City of Montpelier,1 5 5 the United States District Court for the
District of Vermont, relying on Monell and Rizzo, held that a good faith

immunity is available to a municipality. 156 In so doing, the Court equated
the municipality's immunity to that of its officers 157 and concluded that as

149. 554 F.2d at 96. Plaintiffs in this class action sought injunctive relief from unreasonable
automobile searches against long haired travellers along New Jersey roads. Id. at 95.
150. Id.at 95. The Third Circuit was of the opinion the Rizzo precluded the granting of the
relief sought. Id. at 94.
151. It is submitted that Rizzo represents a barrier to making § 1983 an effective remedy.
Rizzo has been interpreted by commentators as being a substantive restriction on § 1983. See,
e.g., The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 243 (1976); 30 RUTGERS L. REV.
103, 141-43 (1977). One author has stated that Rizzo "virtually assured local police officials of
immunity from answering to federal courts for the unlawful behavior of their underlings ...
The result is a severe attenuation of the viability of section 1983 to support federal jurisdiction
to prevent or to remedy state violations of federal rights." Id. (footnote omitted). However,
another author has stated: "The case thus may be read to stand for the proposition that when
power touching on individual rights is widely dispersed, some random abuses of that power are
to be expected and cannot be equated with a violation on the part of the government as a
whole." Levin, supra note 44, at 1541. In support of this contention, the author points out that
courts nevertheless continue to hear civil rights cases alleging liability on the basis of negligent
supervision. Id. at 1541-42, 1541 n.226 (wherein the author asserts that the decision of the
amount of leeway municipalities should have is an open question). It is submitted, however,
that the development of the § 1983 cause of action is inextricably intertwined with the way the
courts read Rizzo. If negligent supervision by high municipal policymakers is not actionable
under Rizzo, § 1983, it is submitted, will become a weak remedy, as rarely will a policy be so
express that it can be proven. One court has stated: "The standard for municipal liability predicated on inaction of senior personnel must be frankly acknowledged as difficult to meet." Smith
v. Ambrogio, 456 F. Supp. 1130, 1137 (D. Conn. 1978). But see Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829
(5th Cir. 1976), wherein damages were assessed against supervisory officials for their failure to
control a policeman who had a known propensity forviolence. Id. at 832. Rizzo was distinguished on the grounds that in Sims there was no request for injunctive relief to prevent future
abuses. Id.
152. See 496 U.S. at 701.
153. See W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 977-84 (4th ed. 1971).
154. See, e.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). For a
discussion on the various forms of official immunity, see, e.g., Freed, Executive Official Immunity for Constitutional Violations: An Analysis and A Critique, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 526 (1977);
Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 3, at 1209-17.
155. 467 F. Supp. 324 (D. Vt. 1979).
156. Id. at 343.
157. Id. The Ohland court stated that "§ 1983 liability of local governmental entities should
be limited by a qualified good faith immunity parallel to that applicable to individual government employees." Id.
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there was no malice involved in the imposition of an unconstitutional policy,
there could be no liability. 158 It should be noted that Ohland represents a
virtually insurmountable barrier to the imposition of municipal liability. The
deprivation in Ohland was clearly a result of a defined custom, 15 9 yet there
was no liability due to the policymakers' belief that their actions were constitutional. 160
The development of such a restrictive view of municipal liability cannot
truly be justified by either a legislative determination or adherence to Rizzo
and Monell. The answer, therefore, must lie elsewhere. Although discounted
in Monell,161 it is submitted that the current municipal fiscal crisis is and
will continue to be a major factor in the imposition of a restrictive view of
162
municipal liability.
While the ultimate scope of municipal liability remains an open ques-

tion, it is clear that Monell will put an end to the numerous alternative
theories of liability which had developed in response to Monroe. 163 For
example, the use of official capacity suits to bypass Monroe's liability bar is
no longer feasible in light of the Monell Court's reaffirmation of Kenosha. 164
Furthermore, the movement towards an implied cause of action under
the fourteenth amendment has been effectively stalled. In Turpin v.
Mailet, 165 which was decided the day before Monell, the Second Circuit
implied a direct cause of action against a municipality under the fourteenth
amendment. 1 66 The Supreme Court vacated that judgment, 167 and on remand the Second Circuit stated that "there is no place for a cause of action

against a municipality directly under the 14th Amendment because the

158. The Ohland court stated that the test for the municipality is the same as that for its
officers in that there is no liability if "they [the officials] reasonably believed that their actions
were constitutional and they did not act with any malicious intention toward the injured plaintiff." Id. at 347 (citations omitted).
159. See id. at 339. Plaintiff was discharged without a hearing under the belief that his probationary period was one year when in fact it was only six months. Discharges after the probationary period could only take place after a hearing. Id.
160. Id. at 347. The result in Ohland is subject to criticism. Ohland would seem to require
that the law be certain before officials or municipalities are liable. Id. at 345, citing Procunier v.
Navarette, 434 U.S 555, 565 (1978). One commentator has suggested that the imposition of a
"settled law" approach is "akin to an absolute immunity." Freed, supra note 154, at 564. See
also Comment, Monell v. Department of Social Services: The Court Compromises on Municipal
Liability Under Section 1983, 57 N.C.L. REV. 459, 474 (1979).
161. See 436 U.S. at 699-700. For a discussion of the Court's failure to truly address the
municipal fiscal crisis, see note 138 and accompanying text supra.
162. See notes 152-54 and accompanying text supra. A number of courts have discussed the
fiscal situation in determining the scope of § 1983 liability. See, e.g., Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d
152, 165-66 (2d Cir.), vacated sub norn. West Haven v. Turpin, 99 S. Ct. 554 (1978), on
remand, Turpin v. Mailet, 591 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Ohland v. City of
Montpelier, 467 F. Supp. 324 (D. Vt. 1979).
163. See notes 53-78 and accompanying text supra.
164. See note 118 and accompanying text supra.
165. 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.), vacated sub nora. West Haven v. Turpin, 99 S. Ct. 554 (1978),
on remand, Turpin v. Mailet, 591 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
166. See 579 F.2d at 164.
167. 99 S. Ct. 554 (1978).
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plaintiff may proceed against the . . . [city] under § 1983."
have similarly followed suit. 16 9

168

Other courts

IV. CONCLUSION

Despite the unresolved areas, Monell clearly granted the possibility of
recourse for civil rights violations caused by a municipality. It is submitted
that this recognition of municipal liability will also provide a municipality
170
with a potent impetus to deter constitutional violations by its employees.
Aside from these meritorious results, the Monell holding can also be supported on the basis of legal consistency. The holding remedied the anomaly
of municipality immunity in federal court when a majority of states had ab1 71
rogated that immunity.
Furthermore, Monell was responsive to the major criticism of the section 1983 municipal immunity doctrine-that it vitiated "the elaborate
statutory scheme to protect individuals from governmental abuses." 172 The
lower courts, through the various circumvention attempts, had tried to
reinstate that scheme, leading to a great deal of confusion. 173 By overruling
Monroe, Monell obviated the need for such machinations, and thus allowed
the lower courts to finally focus on the true issue concerning the contours of
municipal liability under section 1983.174

Since it is the resolution of this

168. 591 F.2d at 427.
169. For a general discussion of the implied cause of action under the fourteenth amendment, see notes 75-81 and accompanying text supra.
170. One author has stated:
Deterrence of constitutional torts should be enhanced by holding municipalities liable
for damages. The municipality could be expected to make its employees aware of the risk
of this liability and would probably act vigorously to secure their adherence to constitutional standards. Moreover, the present rule of personal liability is not an effective
weapon against the nefarious official, if he exists. At present the official has recourse to
two defenses .. . . If the municipality itself is exposed to liability, the hypothetical illinclined official will not have these defenses available when the municipality fixes blame
internally for constitutional torts.
Hundt, supra note 43, at 782-83.
171. As of 1978, a total of 36 states and the District of Columbia had either judicially or
legislatively abrogated the common law doctrine of municipal tort immunity. See Oroz v. Board
of County Commn'rs, 575 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Wyo. 1978). The states which have so acted are:
Alaska; Arizona; Colorado; Connecticut; Georgia; Hawaii; Idaho; Illinois; Indiana; Iowa; Kansas;
Kentucky; Louisiana; Maine; Michigan; Minnesota; Montana; Nebraska; Nevada; New Hampshire; New Jersey; New Mexico; New York; North Carolina; North Dakota; Oklahoma; Oregon;
Rhode Island; South Carolina; Tennessee; Texas; Utah; Vermont; Washington; West Virginia;
Wisconsin; and the District of Columbia. See, e.g., Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 593, 544 P.2d
1153, 1158 (1975); Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 608-09, 305 A.2d 877, 889
(1973); Oroz v. Board of County Comm'rs, 575 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Wyo. 1978). For a general
discussion of the movement to abrogate municipal immunity, see W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS
984-87 (4th ed. 1971).
172. Kates & Kouba, supra note 27, at 132. It is submitted that it is not so clear that Monel
completely revitalized § 1983 since the scope of a municipality's liability may be narrow. See
notes 139-60 and accompanying text supra.
173. For a discussion of lower court attempts to circumvent the municipal immunity doctrine, see notes 51-78 and accompanying text supra.
174. Cf. Levin, supra note 44, at 1539-41 (Monroe should be interpreted as a bar to respondeat superior, and lower courts should be free to develop the scope of liability).
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question that will determine whether section 1983 can provide an effective
means of vindicating civil rights violations by a municipality, however,
Monell does not resolve that issue, but merely poses it.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the Supreme Court, by overruling
the section 1983 municipal immunity doctrine, took a major step toward
giving new meaning to the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Within Monell, however, remain the seeds for the eventual perpetuation of the prior inefficacy
of section 1983.
Howard M. Klein
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